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Abstract
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e.,
scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of
the well-studied unrelated machines scheduling problem, in which every given task can be executed
only by two pre-specified machines in the case of graphs or a given subset of machines in the case of
hypergraphs. This corresponds to a multigraph whose nodes are the machines and its hyperedges
are the tasks. This class of problems belongs to multidimensional mechanism design, for which there
are no known general mechanisms other than the VCG and its generalization to affine minimizers.
We propose a new class of mechanisms that are truthful and have significantly better performance
than affine minimizers in many settings. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for truthful
mechanisms for general multigraphs, as well as special classes of graphs such as stars, trees, planar
graphs, k-degenerate graphs, and graphs of a given treewidth. We also consider the objective of
minimizing or maximizing the Lp-norm of the values of the players, a generalization of the makespan
minimization that corresponds to p = ∞, and extend the results to any p > 0.
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1 Introduction
This work belongs to the area of mechanism design, one of the most researched branches
of Game Theory and Microeconomics with numerous applications in environments where a
protocol of conduct of selfish participants is required. The goal is to design an algorithm,
called mechanism, which is robust under selfish behavior and that produces a social outcome
with a certain guaranteed quality. The mechanism solicits the preferences of the participants
over the outcomes, in forms of bids, and then selects one of the outcomes. The challenge stems
from the fact that the real preferences of the participants are private, and the participants
care only about maximizing their private utilities and hence they will lie if a false report
is profitable. A truthful mechanism provides incentives such that a truthful bid is the best
action for each participant.
Despite the importance of the problem the only general positive result for multi-
dimensional domains is the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [43, 15, 26]
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In their seminal paper on algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ronen [39] proposed
the scheduling problem on unrelated machines as a central problem to understand the
algorithmic aspects of mechanism design. The objective is to incentivize n machines to
execute m tasks, so that the maximum completion time of the machines, i.e. the makespan,
is minimized. Scheduling, a problem that has been extensively studied from the classical
algorithmic perspective, proved to be the perfect ground to study the limitations that
truthfulness imposes on algorithm design.
Nisan and Ronen applied the VCG mechanism, the most successful generic machinery
in mechanism design, which truthfully implements the outcome that maximizes the social
welfare. In the case of scheduling, the allocation of the VCG is the greedy allocation in
which each task is assigned to the machine with minimum processing time. This mechanism
is truthful, but has a poor approximation ratio of n for the makespan. They conjectured
that this is the best guarantee that can be achieved by any deterministic (polynomial-time
or not) truthful mechanism and this conjecture, known as the Nisan-Ronen conjecture, is
widely perceived as the holy grail in algorithmic mechanism design.
An interesting special case of the scheduling problem, which is well-understood, is the
single-dimensional mechanism design in which the values of each player are linear expressions
of a single parameter. The principal representative is the problem of scheduling related
machines, where the cost of each machine can be expressed via a single parameter, its
speed. This was first studied by Archer and Tardos [1], who showed that in contrast to the
unrelated machines version, an algorithm that minimizes the makespan can be truthfully
implemented – albeit in exponential time. It was subsequently shown that truthfulness
has essentially no impact on the computational complexity of the problem. Specifically, a
randomized truthful-in-expectation1 PTAS was given in [18] and a deterministic PTAS was
given in [14]; a PTAS is the best possible algorithm even for the pure algorithmic problem
(unless P = NP ).
1.1 Summary of Results
In this work, we show how to combine these two main positive results of VCG and single-
dimensional mechanisms into a single mechanism, which we call the Hybrid Mechanism. This
new mechanism applies to domains in which some players are multidimensional and some
players are single-dimensional. A typical example is to schedule m tasks, such that task i
can only be executed by player 0 and player i. In this case, player 0 is multidimensional and
the other m players are single-dimensional. We call this the star balancing problem. This is
a multidimensional mechanism design problem for which the VCG mechanism, as well as
every other known mechanism, performs very poorly. However, as we show in Section 3.1,
the Hybrid Mechanism has approximation ratio 2, optimal among all truthful mechanisms.
We generalize the star balancing problem in three directions: graphs/multigraphs, hyperstars
and also to objectives other than makespan minimization. Due to space limitations, omitted
proofs are presented in the full version.
(Multi)Graphs. A generalization of the star balancing problem to graphs and multigraphs
is the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem (Section 3). This is a special case of unrelated
machines scheduling in which there is a (multi)graph whose nodes represent the machines
1 This is one of the two main definitions of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, where truth-telling
maximizes the expected utility of each player.
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and whose edges represent tasks that can be executed only by the incident nodes. For general
graphs, all machines are multiparameter, but we can still apply the Hybrid Mechanism, if we
first decompose the graph into stars and then apply the Hybrid Mechanism to each one of
them. The combined mechanism, which we call the Star-Cover Mechanism, has surprisingly
good approximation ratio for certain classes of graphs – ratio 4 for trees, 8 for planar graphs,
and 2k+2 for k-degenerate graphs (Corollary 15). These results use as ingredient the analysis
of star graphs, in which the Hybrid Mechanism has approximation ratio 2.
Hyperstars. In the hyperstar version, there are k multidimensional players/machines and
every task can be executed by any one of these k players or by a task-specific single-dimensional
player. Specifically, there are k different root players (players 1, 2, . . . , k with bids (rij)k×m)
and each of them are allowed to process all tasks. In addition, for each task there is one
leaf player, which can process only this single task (players k + 1, k + 2, . . . , k + m with
bids (ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . ℓm)). Note that the root players without the leaves form a classic input for
unrelated scheduling mechanisms with k players and m-tasks. We can now state the Hybrid
Mechanism for this case.













where the λi can be arbitrary non-negative real numbers and (gT )T ⊆M can be any functions
that guarantee that the leaf players are truthful. The output of the mechanism is the subset of
tasks T that are allocated to the multidimensional root players together with their allocation
matrix xT . The remaining tasks, M \ T , are allocated to the leaf players.
VCG fairs poorly, yielding approximation ratio m in this domain, but the Hybrid
Mechanism has approximation ratio k + 1, as stated in the next theorem. Due to space
limitations, we provide details and proofs in the full version of the paper.
▶ Theorem 2. For the hyperstar scheduling problem, the Hybrid Mechanism with gT (ℓ) =
maxj /∈T ℓj , and with λi = 1, for every i, is (k + 1)-approximate.
In Section 4 we provide general definitions as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for
truthfulness of the Hybrid Mechanism.
Mechanisms for Lp-norm optimization. In Section 5, we consider the much more general
objective of minimizing or maximizing the Lp-norm of the values of the players, for p > 0.
The scheduling problem is the special case of minimizing the L∞-norm. We show that the
Hybrid Mechanism performs very well for this much more general problem, and in some cases
it has the optimal approximation ratio among all truthful mechanisms. This illustrates the
applicability and usefulness of the Hybrid Mechanism in applications with various domains
and objectives. We emphasize that for all these cases, even for stars, all known mechanisms
such as the VCG and affine maximizers have very poor performance.
Relation to the Nisan-Ronen conjecture. Our results on (multi)graphs show that this
domain may provide an easier way to attack the Nisan-Ronen conjecture. In a recent
work [12], we showed a Ω(
√
n) lower bound for multistars with edge multiplicity only 2, when
the root player has submodular or supermodular valuations. In contrast, our results in this
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work show that for additive valuations, the Star-Cover Mechanism has approximation ratio 4
on the very same multigraphs. However, the Hybrid and the Star-Cover Mechanisms have
high approximation for multistars with high edge-multiplicity or for simple clique graphs.
It is natural to ask whether there are other, better mechanisms for these cases. Recently
we have proved a Ω(
√
n) lower bound for the former case, which is the first super-constant
lower bound for the Nisan-Ronen problem [11], and we conjecture that the latter case admits
similarly a high, perhaps even linear, lower bound.
We remark that all previous lower bound proofs use inherently either (multi)graphs
[13, 29, 11] or, recently, hypergraphs with hyperedges of small size [24, 20]. Our work
provides new methodological tools to study these objects, that can help to identify certain
(hyper)graph structures as good candidates for high lower bounds and to avoid those where
low upper bounds exist. For example, the 2.755 lower bound construction of [24] uses a
hyperstar with k = 2, for which the Hybrid Mechanism achieves an upper bound of 3 (Thm 2).
All our lower bounds are information theoretic and hold independently of the computa-
tional time of the mechanisms. Conversely, all upper bounds are polynomial time algorithms
when the star decomposition is given. We leave it open whether computing an optimal
star decomposition of a graph is in P , although it follows from our results that it can be
approximated with an additive term of 1 in polynomial time (actually in linear time).
1.2 Related Work
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture [39] has become one of the central problems in Algorithmic
Game Theory, and despite intensive efforts it remains open. The original paper showed that
no truthful deterministic mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 2 for
two machines, which was later improved to 2.41 [13] for three machines, and finally to 2.618
[29] which was the best known bound for over a decade. Recent progress improved this bound
to 2.755 [24], to 3 [20] and finally to the first non-constant lower bound of 1 +
√
n− 1 [11].
The best known upper bound is n [39].
The purely algorithmic problem of makespan minimization on unrelated machines is
one of the most important scheduling problems. The seminal paper of Lenstra, Shmoys
and Tardos [32], gave a 2-approximation algorithm, and also showed that it is NP-hard to
approximate within a factor of 3/2. Closing this gap has remained open for 30 years, and is
considered one of the most important open questions in scheduling.
In this work we consider the design of truthful mechanisms for the Unrelated Graph
Balancing problem, a special but quite rich case of the unrelated machines problem, which
was previously studied by Verschae and Wiese [42], for which each task can only be assigned
to two machines. This can be formulated as a graph problem, where given an undirected
(multi)-graph G = (V,E), each vertex corresponds to a machine, and each edge corresponds
to a task. The goal is to allocate each edge to one of its nodes, in a way that minimizes the
maximum (weighted) in-degree.
The special case of this problem where each direction of an edge corresponds to the
same processing time t(e) is known as Graph Balancing, and was introduced by Ebenlendr,
Krcál, and Sgall [21] who showed an 1.75-approximate algorithm and also demonstrated that
the problem retains the hardness of the unrelated machines problem, by showing that it is
NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than 3/2.
Graph Balancing. As was already mentioned, for the pure graph balancing problem, the
best approximation ratio for classical polynomial time algorithms is 1.75 by [21]. Wang and
Sitters [44] showed a different LP-based algorithm with a higher ratio of 11/6 ≈ 1.83, while
Huang and Ott [27] designed a purely combinatorial approximation algorithm but with also
a higher guarantee of 1.857.
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Jansen and Rohwedder [28] studied the so-called configuration LP which was introduced
by Bansal and Sviridenko [6]. They showed that it has an integrality gap of at most 1.749
breaking the 1.75 barrier of the integrality gaps of the previous LP formulations. This leaves
open the possibility of using this LP to produce an approximation algorithm with a ratio
better than 1.75.
Verschae and Wiese [42] studied the unrelated version of graph balancing (whose strategic
variant we consider in this paper) and showed that the integrality gap of the configuration
LP is equal to 2, which is much higher comparing to graph balancing. They also showed a
2-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing the minimum load, which is the
best possible unless P=NP.
The problem has been studied for various special graph classes. For the case of simple
graphs (also known as Graph Orientation), Asahiro et al [2] showed that the problem is in P
for the case of trees, while Asahiro, Miyano and Ono [3] showed that it becomes strongly
NP-hard for planar and bipartite graphs. Finally, Lee, Leung and Pinedo [31] concluded the
case of trees in the case of multiple edges, showing an FPTAS which is the best possible,
given that the problem in multi-graphs is immediately NP-hard even for the simple case of
two vertices (due to reduction from Subset Sum).
Truthful Scheduling. The lack of progress in the original unrelated machine problem led
to the study of special cases where progress has been made. Ashlagi et al.[4], resolved
a restricted version of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture, for the special but natural class of
anonymous mechanisms. Lavi and Swamy [30] studied a restricted input domain which
however retains the multi-dimensional flavour of the setting. They considered inputs with
only two possible values “low” and “high”, that are publicly known to the designer. For this
case they showed an elegant deterministic mechanism with an approximation factor of 2.
They also showed that even for this setting achieving the optimal makespan is not possible
under truthfulness, and provided a lower bound of 11/10. Yu [45] extended the results for a
range of values, and Auletta et al. [5] studied multi-dimensional domains where the private
information of the machines is a single bit.
Randomization has led to mildly improved guarantees. There are two extensions of
truthfulness for randomized mechanisms; universal truthfulness if the mechanism is described
as a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms, and truthfulness-in-
expectation, if in expectation no player can benefit by lying. The former notion was first
considered in [39] for two machines, it was later extended to n machines by Mu’alem and
Schapira [38] and finally Lu and Yu [35] showed a 0.837n-approximate mechanism, which is
currently the best known. Lu and Yu [36] showed a truthful-in-expectation mechanism with
an approximation guarantee of (m+ 5)/2. Mu’alem and Schapira [38], showed a lower bound
of 2 − 1/m, for both notions of randomization. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács [10]
extended this lower bound for fractional mechanisms, where each task can be split to multiple
machines, and they also showed a fractional mechanism with a guarantee of (m+ 1)/2. The
special case of two machines [34, 36] is still unresolved; currently, the best upper bound is
1.587 due to Chen, Du, and Zuluaga [9].
The case of related machines is well understood. It falls into the so-called single-
dimensional mechanism design in which the valuations of a player are linear expressions of a
single parameter. In this case, the cost of each machine is expressed via a single parameter, its
(inverse) speed multiplied by the workload allocated to the machine, instead of an m-valued
vector, as it is the case for the unrelated machines and the Graph Balancing setting. Archer
and Tardos [1] showed that, in contrast to the unrelated machines version, the optimal
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makespan can be achieved by an (exponential-time) truthful algorithm, while [14] gave a
deterministic truthful PTAS which is the best possible even for the pure algorithmic problem
(unless P=NP).
Truthful implementation of other objectives was considered by Mu’alem and Schapira [38]
for multi-dimensional problems and by Epstein, Levin and van Stee [22] for single-dimensional
ones. Leucci, Mamageishvili and Penna [33] demonstrated high lower bounds for other min-
max objectives on some combinatorial optimization problems on graphs, showing essentially
that VCG is the best mechanism for these problems. Minooei and Swamy [37] considered
a multi-dimensional vertex cover problem, and approached in by decomposition into single
parameter problems.
The Bayesian setting, where the players costs are drawn from a probability distribution
has also been studied. Daskalakis and Weinberg [17] showed a mechanism that is at
most a factor of 2 from the optimal truthful mechanism, but not with respect to the
optimal makespan. Chawla et al. [8] provided bounds of prior-independent mechanisms
(where the input distribution is unknown to the mechanism), while Giannakopoulos and
Kyropoulou [25] showed that the VCG mechanism achieves a factor of O(logn/ log logn)
under some distributional and symmetry assumptions.
Recently Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Kovács [12] showed a lower bound of
√
n− 1
for all deterministic truthful mechanisms, when the cost of processing a subset of tasks is
given by a submodular (or supermodular) set function, instead of an additive function which
is assumed in the standard scheduling setting.
2 Preliminaries
Scheduling. In the classical unrelated machines scheduling there is a set N of n machines
and a set M of m tasks that need to be scheduled on the machines. The input is given by
a nonnegative matrix t = (tij)n×m : machine i needs time tij ∈ R≥0 to process task j, and
her costs are additive, i.e., the processing time for machine i for a set of tasks Xi ⊂ M is
ti(Xi) :=
∑
j∈Xi tij . The objective is to minimize the makespan (min-max objective). An
allocation to all machines X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), (which is a partition of M) can also be
denoted by the characteristic matrix x = (xij) where xij = 1 if j ∈ Xi, and xij = 0 otherwise.
The current work essentially considers a special case of unrelated scheduling, in which
every task can be processed by two designated machines. The tasks can thus be modelled by
the edges of a graph, and the associated problem is also known as Unrelated Graph Balancing.
More formally, in the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem, there is a given undirected graph
G = (V,E); the vertices correspond to a set of machines N = V and the edges to a set of
tasks M = E. For each edge e ∈ E only its two incident vertices can process the job e,
and they have in general different processing times ti(e), and ti′(e). The goal is to assign
a direction to each edge e = (i, i′) (allocate the corresponding task) of the graph, to one
of the incident vertices (machines). The completion time of each vertex i is then the total
processing time of the jobs Xi assigned to it ti(Xi) =
∑
e∈Xi ti(e). The objective is to find an
allocation that minimizes the makespan, i.e. the maximum completion time over all vertices.
Mechanism design setting. We assume that each machine i ∈ N is controlled by a selfish
agent that is reluctant to process the tasks and the cost function ti is private information
(also called the type of agent i). A mechanism asks the agents to report (bid) their types ti,
and based on the collected bids it allocates the jobs, and gives payments to the agents. A
player may report a false cost function bi ̸= ti, if this serves her interests.
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Formally, a mechanism (X,P ) consists of two parts:
An allocation algorithm: The allocation algorithm X allocates the tasks to the machines
depending on the players’ bids b = (b1, . . . , bn). We denote by Xi(b) the subset of tasks
assigned to machine i in the bid profile b.
A payment scheme: The payment scheme P = (P1, . . . , Pn) determines the payments also
depending on the bid values b. The functions P1, . . . , Pn stand for the payments that the
mechanism hands to each agent.
The utility ui of a player i is the payment that she gets minus the actual time that she
needs to process the set of tasks assigned to her, ui(b) = Pi(b) − ti(Xi(b)). We are interested
in truthful mechanisms. A mechanism is truthful, if for every player, reporting his true type
is a dominant strategy. Formally,
ui(ti, b−i) ≥ ui(t′i, b−i), ∀i ∈ N, ti, t′i ∈ Rm≥0, b−i ∈ R
(n−1)×m
≥0 ,
where b−i denotes the reported bidvectors of all players disregarding i.
We are looking for truthful mechanisms with low approximation ratio of the allocation
algorithm for the makespan irrespective of the running time to compute X and P. In other
words, our lower bounds are information-theoretic and do not take into account computational
issues.
A useful characterization of truthful mechanisms in terms of the following monotonicity
condition, helps us to get rid of the payments and focus on the properties of the allocation
algorithm.
▶ Definition 3 (Weak Monotonicity). An allocation algorithm X is called weakly monotone
(WMON) if it satisfies the following property: for every two inputs t = (ti, t−i) and t′ =
(t′i, t−i), the associated allocations X and X ′ satisfy ti(Xi) − ti(X ′i) ≤ t′i(Xi) − t′i(X ′i).
It is well known that the allocation function of every truthful mechanism is WMON [7],
and also that this is a sufficient condition for truthfulness in convex domains [41].
The following lemma was essentially shown in [39] and has been a useful tool to show
lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for several variants (see for example [13, 38]).
▶ Lemma 4. Let t be a bid vector, and let S = Xi(t) be the subset assigned to player i by
a weakly monotone allocation X. For any bid vector t′ = (t′i, t−i) such that only the bid of
machine i has changed and in such a way that for every task in S it has decreased (i.e.,
t′ij < tij , j ∈ S) and for every other task it has increased (i.e., t′ij > tij , j ∈ M \ S). Then
the mechanism does not change the allocation to machine i, i.e., Xi(t′) = Xi(t) = S.
In general, when the values of a machine change, the allocation of the other machines may
change, this issue being the pivotal difficulty of truthful unrelated scheduling. Allocation
algorithms that “promise” not to change the allocation of other machines as long as changing
(only) ti does not affect the set Xi, are less problematic. These allocation rules are called
local in [39], where it is shown that local truthful mechanisms cannot have a better than n
approximation.
▶ Definition 5 (Local mechanisms). A mechanism is local if for every i ∈ N , for every t−i, and
ti, t
′
i for which Xi(ti, t−i) = Xi(t′i, t−i) also holds that Xj(ti, t−i) = Xj(t′i, t−i) (∀j ∈ N).
There are several special classes of mechanisms that satisfy this property, perhaps the
most prominent one is the class of affine minimizers (see, e.g., [13]).
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3 Graph Balancing
In this section we focus on the (Unrelated) Graph Balancing problem, which is a special
case of makespan minimization of scheduling unrelated machines. The Graph Balancing
is a multi-parameter mechanism design problem that retains most of the difficulty of the
Nisan-Ronen conjecture, yet has certain features that make it more amenable.
One of the difficulties in dealing with truthful mechanisms is that while truthfulness is
a local property (i.e., independent truthfulness conditions, one per player), the allocation
algorithm is a global function (that involves all players). Local algorithms attempt to
reconcile this tension by insisting that the allocation is also “local”, but they take this notion
too far. The results of this work show that locality in mechanisms is very restrictive in some
domains, where the Hybrid Mechanism outperforms every local mechanism.
The Graph Balancing problem is more amenable than the general scheduling problem
because it exhibits another kind of locality, domain locality: when a machine does not get
a task, we know which machines gets it. Yet, this locality is not very restrictive and the
problem retains most of its original difficulty.
In this section, we take advantage of domain locality to obtain an optimal mechanism
for stars. It turns out that this mechanism, the Hybrid Mechanism, is a special case of a
more general mechanism. But since the Hybrid Mechanism does not apply to general graphs,
we also propose the Star-Cover mechanism for general graphs: decompose the graph into
stars and apply the Hybrid Mechanism independently to each star. In this way, we obtain a
4-approximation algorithm for trees and similar positive results for other types of graphs.
Makespan minimization is the special case, when p = ∞, of minimizing the Lp-norm of
the values of the players. Other special cases of the Lp-norm optimization is the case p = 1,
which corresponds to welfare maximization, and the case p = 0, which is related to Nash
Social Welfare [16]. We deal with this more general problem in another section (Section 5).
Most of the results and proofs of this section generalize to any p ≥ 1. We provide almost
all the proofs in this section, because we believe that the Graph Balancing problem is an
important problem in its own right and because the treatment is simpler and more intuitive,
and we omit most of the (more general) results of Section 5 that deals with the Lp-norm
minimization, due to space limitations.
3.1 Stars and the Hybrid Mechanism
In this subsection, we focus on star graphs, where there are n = m+ 1 players and m tasks.
Player 0 is the root of the star, and has processing times given by a vector r = (r1, r2, . . . rm).
We also refer to this player as the root player or r-player. For given bids r of the root player,
and task set T ⊆ M we use the short notation r(T ) =
∑
j∈T rj .
There are also m leaf-players, one for each leaf of the star with processing times ℓ =
(ℓ1, . . . , ℓm) respectively. Each task j can only be assigned to two players; either to the root,
with processing time rj , or to the leaf with processing time ℓj .
As usual, we denote by r−i the vector of bids of the root player except for the bid for
task i, and similarly ℓ−i denotes the bids of all leaf-players, except for player i. The vector of
all input bids is given by t = (r, ℓ).
As we show later in the Lower Bound section (Section 3.3), all previously known mechan-
isms for the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem, e.g. affine minimizers and task independent
mechanisms, have approximation ratio at least
√
n− 1 for graphs, even for stars.
In contrast, we now show that the Hybrid Mechanism has constant approximation ratio
for stars.









Figure 1 An instance of the Hybrid Mechanism, for the star of m = 2 leaves. It shows the
partition of bid-space of the root player induced by the allocation of the Hybrid Mechanism when
ℓ1 ≥ ℓ2 (left) and when ℓ2 ≥ ℓ1 (right). In the left case, the root gets both tasks in the area near
(0, 0), it gets only task 1 when r1 ≤ ℓ1 − ℓ2 and r2 ≥ ℓ2, and it gets neither task otherwise. Note that,
in contrast to VCG, for every set of fixed values for the leaves, only three allocations are possible.
▶ Definition 6 (Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Balancing). Consider an instance of the Unrelated
Graph Balancing problem on a star of n nodes and set of tasks M . Let
S ∈ arg min
T ⊆M
{r(T ) + max
i ̸∈T
ℓi}. (1)
The mechanism assigns a set of tasks S to the root and the remaining tasks to leaves. Ties
are broken in a deterministic way (e.g., lexicographically).
Figure 1 shows the partition of the space of the root player induced by the Hybrid
Mechanism for a star of two leaves.
The argmin expression that defines the Hybrid Mechanism and a corresponding expression
that defines the VCG mechanism are similar: in the definition of VCG, instead of maxi ̸∈T ℓi,
we have
∑
i ̸∈T ℓi. It is a happy coincidence that replacing the operator sum with max
preserves the truthfulness of the mechanism, a fact that rarely holds.
▶ Lemma 7. The Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Balancing on stars is truthful and has
approximation ratio 2.
Proof. The root player has no incentive to lie since − maxi ̸∈T ℓi can be interpreted as its
payments. The reason that leaf players have no incentive to lie comes essentially from the
fact that the expression in (1) is monotone in ℓi (see Section 4, for a more rigorous and
extensive treatment of the truthfulness of the general Hybrid Mechanism).
Let S∗ = arg minT ⊆M max{r(T ), maxi̸∈T ℓi} be the subset assigned to the root in the
optimal allocation, OPT be the optimal makespan, and ALG be the makespan achieved by
the Hybrid Mechanism. Then we have
ALG ≤ min
T ⊆M
{r(T ) + max
i ̸∈T
ℓi} ≤ r(S∗) + max
i ̸∈S∗
ℓi ≤ 2 max{r(S∗), max
i̸∈S∗
ℓi} = 2OPT. ◀
3.2 Upper bound for general graphs and multigraphs
We now turn our attention to positive (upper bound) results for general graphs and multi-
graphs. We will need a few definitions first.
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▶ Definition 8 (Star decomposition). A star decomposition of a (multi)graph G(V,E) is
a partition T = {T1, . . . , Tk} of its edges into stars (see Figure 2 for an example). Let
V (Ti) denote the vertex set of the star spanned by Ti. The star contention number of a star
decomposition is the maximum number of stars that include a node either as a root or as
a leaf: c(T ) = maxv∈V |{i : v ∈ V (Ti), i = 1, . . . , k}|. The star contention number of a
(multi)graph is the minimum star contention number among all its star decompositions.
In an optimal star decomposition of a graph (but not multigraph), we can assume that
every node is the root of at most one star, otherwise we can merge stars with common root
without changing the star contention number.
A related notion to star decomposition that has been studied extensively is the notion of
edge orientation of a multigraph (or of load balancing when we consider multigraphs).
▶ Definition 9 (Edge orientation number). Define the orientation number of a given orientation
of the edges of a multigraph G, as its maximum in-degree. The edge orientation number o(G)
of a multigraph G is the minimum orientation number among all its possible orientations.
Indeed the two notions are closely related: every star decomposition corresponds to a
graph orientation by orienting the edges in all stars from roots to leaves, and vice versa a
graph orientation gives rise to a star decomposition in which every node with its outgoing
edges defines a star. Given that in an optimal star decomposition of a graph, each node is
the root of at most one star, we get that for every graph G:
o(G) ≤ c(G) ≤ o(G) + 1.
This relation for multigraphs is similar only that in the right hand side we add the maximum
edge multiplicity w instead of 1, i.e., o(G) ≤ c(G) ≤ o(G) + w.
The following definition utilizes the Hybrid Mechanism on stars to obtain a general
mechanism for arbitrary graphs (and multigraphs).
▶ Definition 10 (Star-Cover Mechanism). Let G = (V,E) be a multigraph and let T =
{T1, . . . , Tk} be a fixed star decomposition. The Star-Cover mechanism runs the Hybrid
Mechanism on every star of T independently. That is, if Si,h is the subset of tasks allocated
to a player i by the Hybrid Mechanism when applied to a star Th, the set of tasks allocated to
player i is Si = ∪kh=1Si,h.
We can now state and prove the general positive theorem of this section.
▶ Theorem 11. The Star-Cover mechanism for a given multigraph G that uses the Hybrid
Mechanism on every star of a fixed star decomposition T = {T1, . . . , Tk} is truthful and has
an approximation ratio at most 2c(T ).
Proof. Fix some player i and let Si,h be the subset of tasks allocated to player i by the
Star Mechanism when applied to a star Th, h = 1, . . . , k. Truthfulness is an immediate
consequence of the following two observations. First, since the fixed star decomposition is
independent of player i’s processing times, player i cannot affect it by lying. Second, Si,h is
independent of player i’s processing times ti(e) for all edges e ̸∈ Th, therefore player i cannot
alter the assignment on Th by changing its values outside Th.
To see the approximation guarantee, let OPT , OPT (Th) be the optimal makespan on G
and Th respectively, and let ALG and ALG(Th) be the makespan achieved by the Star-Cover
mechanism on G and Th.
ALG ≤ max
h=1,...,k
c(T ) ·ALG(Th) ≤ max
h=1,...,k
c(T ) · 2OPT (Th) ≤ 2c(T ) ·OPT. ◀
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Due to the connection between star decompositions and edge orientations in graphs, we get
▶ Corollary 12. The approximation ratio for graphs with edge orientation number o(G) is at
most 2o(G) + 2.
In the sequel, we consider particular bounds for certain classes of graphs. It is known
that the edge orientation number of a given graph can be computed in polynomial time [2].
In fact, by an application of the max-flow-min-cut theorem it can be shown that o(G) ≤ γ iff
for every subgraph H of G it holds that |E(H)| ≤ γ|V (H)|. Since this equivalent condition2
holds for planar graphs with γ = 3, we immediately obtain:
▶ Theorem 13. For every planar graph, there exists a truthful mechanism with approximation
ratio 8.
A natural class of graphs fulfilling this property (with γ = k) is k-degenerate graphs. A
graph G(V,E) is called k-degenerate [23] (or k-inductive) if there is an ordering v1, . . . , vn
of its nodes such that the number of neighbors of vi in {vi+1, . . . , vn} is at most k. Many
interesting classes of graphs are k-degenerate for some small k. Besides planar graphs (with
k = 5), another example is given by k-trees [40]: by definition, a k-tree is a degenerate graph
with an ordering such that every vi (except for the last k nodes of the ordering) has exactly k
neighbors in {vi+1, . . . , vn} and these k neighbors form a clique. Since graphs of treewidth k
are subgraphs of k-trees [40], they are also k-degenerate. In particular, trees are 1-degenerate.
We give here a direct proof and illustration of a star decomposition for k-degenerate graphs:
▶ Theorem 14. For every k-degenerate graph, there is a truthful mechanism with approxim-
ation ratio 2k + 2.
Proof. Consider a k-degenerate graph G. It suffices to show that it admits a star decompos-
ition with contention number k + 1. Let v1, . . . , vn be an inductive ordering of the nodes of
G. We consider the star covering {T2, . . . , Tn} where Ti is the star with root vi and leaves
all its neighbors in {v1, . . . , vi−1}. Note that stars are created in the opposite direction of
the inductive order (see Figure 2). This star decomposition has contention number k + 1
since every node belongs to at most one star as a root and to at most k stars as a leaf. ◀
▶ Corollary 15. There exist truthful mechanisms with approximation ratio at most 4 for
trees, and generally of ratio at most 2k + 2 for graphs of treewidth k.
3.3 Lower Bounds for Graph Balancing
In this subsection, we show corresponding negative results for the positive results of the
previous subsection. We first observe that the natural candidate mechanisms for the Graph
Balancing problem have very poor performance, in stark contrast to the Hybrid Mechanism.
▶ Theorem 16. All local mechanisms for stars, including VCG, affine minimizers and





2 This characterization of the orientation number o(G) implies that a truthful mechanism with constant
approximation ratio exists for any minor-closed class of graphs, because for every class of graphs with
forbidden minors, there exists some constant γ that satisfies the property (see Theorems 7.2.3, 7.2.4
and Lemma 12.6.1. in [19]). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Figure 2 The star decomposition used in Theorem 14 of a 2-degenerate graph. The inductive
order is upwards, while the stars are “pointing” downwards.







· · · 1√
m
1 ∞ · · · ∞
∞ 1 · · · ∞
∞ ∞ · · · 1
 .
If, in the allocation of the mechanism, the root player takes all the tasks, then this
allocation has approximation
√
m, as the optimal allocation is to assign the tasks to the
leaves with makespan equal to 1. Otherwise, assume that (at least) one of the tasks, is given
to some other player, say w.l.o.g. task 1 is given to player 1. By a series of applications of
Lemma 4, and by exploiting the locality of the mechanism, we set the value of the owner of
task j to 0 for every j ̸= 1.
In particular, let S be the set of tasks assigned to the root player, and M \S be the tasks
assigned to their respective leaf-player. Let t1 = (r′, ℓ1, . . . , ℓm), with r′ defined as follows
for some arbitrarily small ϵ.
r′j =
{




By applying Lemma 4, the root player receives again the set S, and therefore, the set
M \ S is assigned to the leaves. We proceed by changing the bids of the leaf-players for the
tasks in M \ S to 0, i.e., defining a sequence tj for j ∈ M \ S, with tj = (r′, ℓ′j = 0, ℓ
j−1
−j )
Again, by Lemma 4 and by locality, we get that the allocation of the tasks remains the
same for the leaf j, and for all the other players as well.
We end up with an instance t′ where player 1 still takes the first task, while the rest
of the tasks are assigned to a player with 0 processing time. For t′, the optimal makespan
is 1/
√
m, while the mechanism achieves makespan equal to 1. We illustrate the case when







· · · 1√
m
1 ∞ · · · ∞
∞ 1 · · · ∞
∞ ∞ · · · 1






· · · 1√
m
1 ∞ · · · ∞
∞ 0 · · · ∞
∞ ∞ · · · 0
 ◀
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In the previous subsection, we showed that the Hybrid Mechanism outperforms all known
mechanisms and has approximation ratio at most 2. The next theorem shows that this ratio
is the best possible among all possible mechanisms for stars.
▶ Theorem 17. There is no deterministic mechanism for stars that can achieve an approx-
imation ratio better than 2.
This is a special case of a more general lower bound for the Lp-norm objective (Theorem 30),
but we give the proof here anyway, since it will be an ingredient of the proof of the following
theorem (Theorem 18).
Proof. Let’s assume that the mechanism takes an input where the processing time of the
root player is rj = aj−1, for each task j, where a > 1 is a parameter, and the processing time
of the corresponding leaf player for task j is ℓj = aj , as also shown in the following table.
t =

1 a · · · am−2 am−1
a ∞ · · · ∞ ∞






∞ ∞ · · · am−1 ∞
∞ ∞ · · · ∞ am

If the mechanism assigns all tasks to the root player, then the makespan for this input is
(am−1)/(a−1), while the optimal makespan is am−1, yielding a ratio of (am−1)/((a−1)am−1).
Otherwise, let X be the nonempty set of tasks assigned to the leaf players. Let k be the task
with the maximum index in X. Since it is processed by the leaf player, its processing time is
ak. Now consider the input in which we change the processing times of the root player to
r′j =
{
0 j ̸∈ X
rj + ϵ otherwise
for some arbitrarily small ϵ > 0. By weak monotonicity (Lemma 4), the set of tasks assigned
to the root player remains the same, and as a result the whole allocation stays the same.
Therefore task k is still assigned to the leaf player k and the makespan of the mechanism is
at least ak. Notice that the optimum allocation for this input is ak−1 + ϵ which yields an
approximation ratio of a, as ϵ tends to 0.
In conclusion, the approximation ratio is min{(am − 1)/((a− 1)am−1), a}, for every a > 1.
By choosing a = 2, we see that the ratio is 2 − 1/2m−1, which shows that for the class of stars
no mechanism can have approximation ratio better than 2. For fixed m, the lower bound
is slightly better than 2 − 1/2m−1, by selecting a to be the positive root of the equation
(am − 1)/((a− 1)am−1) = a. ◀
We now show how to extend the previous result to get a lower bound of 1+φ ≈ 2.618 for trees,
and thus for graphs. This matches the best lower bound for the Nisan-Ronen setting [29]
that was known until the recent improvements [24, 20, 11], suggesting that studying the
special case of scheduling in graphs may be useful in attacking the Nisan-Ronen conjecture.
▶ Theorem 18. No mechanism for trees can achieve approximation ratio 1 + φ ≈ 2.618.
Proof. The proof mimics the proof of Theorem 17 on the tree shown in Figure 3. The tree
consists of a star with root 0 and leaves 1, . . . , k in which we add a new node v for each node
v of the star and connect it to v. These new nodes (players), which we call dummy will not
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Figure 3 A star with root 0 and leaves 1, . . . , m and its extension to a tree with dummy nodes.
be assigned any task by any efficient mechanism since we set their processing times to an
arbitrarily high value H. The processing times of the edges of the star are exactly the same
as in the proof of Theorem 17: rj = aj−1 and ℓj = aj , for some a > 1. The processing times
for all edges are given below:
rj = aj−1 ℓj = aj j = 1, . . . , k
r = 0 ℓj = 0
where r and ℓj are the processing times of the star vertices of their respective dummy tasks.
The dummy nodes themselves have a very large processing time H ≫ 1 on these tasks.
We consider two cases. In the first case, all tasks of the star are assigned to the root
player 0. We then consider a new instance in which we slightly lower the processing time
of the root on the tasks of the star (i.e., rj = aj−1 − ϵ for some ϵ > 0) and increase the
processing time of its dummy task r = ak. By weak monotonicity (Lemma 4), the r-player
will take this task and all tasks of the star with a total processing time slightly less than
1 + a+ . . .+ ak = (ak+1 − 1)/(a− 1). It is easy to see that the optimal allocation for this
instance is ak, and the approximation ratio (ak+1 − 1)/((a− 1)ak).
In the second case, at least one task of the star is allocated to a leaf. Let p be the star
task allocated to a leaf with the maximum index (that is, task p of the star is allocated
to leaf-player p and tasks p+ 1, . . . , k are allocated to the root). We consider the instance
in which we change the processing times of the root player as follows: all processing times
of the tasks allocated to the root become 0 and all processing times of the root player for
the remaining tasks increase slightly. By weak monotonicity (Lemma 4), the r-player will
still get the same set of tasks. We now create a new instance by increasing the processing
time of the p-th dummy task: ℓp = ap−1 and slightly decreasing the processing time of
the leaf p for its task in the star: ℓp = ap − ϵ, for some ϵ > 0. Then again by weak
monotonicity (Lemma 4), player p will get these two tasks. Although the allocation of the
other tasks may change, the cost for the mechanism is at least ap + ap−1 − ϵ, while the
optimal allocation has cost ap−1. Therefore, in this case the mechanism has approximation
ratio (ap + ap−1)/ap−1 = a+ 1, as ϵ → 0. In any case, the mechanism has approximation
ratio min{((ak+1 − 1)/((a− 1)ak), a+ 1}. By selecting a = φ, we get a ratio at least 1 + φ
(as k → ∞). ◀
Closing the gap between the above lower bound 2.618 of Theorem 18 and the upper bound 4
(Corollary 15) for mechanisms for trees is a crisp intriguing question.
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4 Hybrid Mechanisms
Here we provide the general definitions related to Hybrid Mechanisms, and show necessary
and sufficient conditions for truthfulness on stars (and hyper-stars3). We emphasize that
this is a multi-dimensional mechanism design setting. Each leaf j has a single dimensional
valuation, given by the scalar ℓj but a root has multi-dimensional preferences, given by the
vector of values. For the sake of convenience, we call non-decreasing real functions increasing,
and non-increasing functions decreasing. We say strictly increasing/decreasing if we want to
emphasize strict monotonicity.
It is known, that an allocation rule can be equipped by a truthful payment scheme iff
it is weakly monotone [41]. The next two propositions give a characterization of the weak
monotonicity property in our case, for the leaf-players, and for the root player, respectively:
▶ Proposition 19. An allocation rule is weakly monotone for a leaf-player i, iff for every r
and every ℓ−i, whenever leaf-player i gets task i with bid ℓi, then he also gets the task with
every smaller bid ℓ′i < ℓi.
▶ Proposition 20. An allocation rule is weakly monotone for the root player if and only
if for every fixed bid vector ℓ of the other players, and every T ⊆ M a constant gT (ℓ)
(i.e., independent of r) exists, such that for every r the root player is allocated a set S ∈
arg minT {r(T ) + gT (ℓ)}.
The canonical choice for truthful payments to the r-player is then P 0S(ℓ) = g∅(ℓ) − gS(ℓ),
and all other truthful payments can be obtained by an additive shift by an arbitrary c(ℓ).
We assume w.l.o.g. that for every fixed ℓ the payments P 0S correspond to an increasing
set-function of S,4 because a set of tasks with higher cost and less payments can not be
allocated to player 0 by a truthful mechanism.5 Motivated by Proposition 20 we restrict our
search for truthful mechanisms on star graphs as follows:
▶ Definition 21 (Hybrid Mechanism). Assume that an m-variate function gT : Rm → R is
given for every T ⊆ M, so that for every fixed vector ℓ ≥ 0 the values {gT (ℓ)}T ⊆M correspond
to a decreasing setfunction of T. For any input (r, ℓ), a Hybrid Mechanism (for the functions
{gT }T ⊆M ) allocates a set S to the root player such that
S ∈ arg min
T
{r(T ) + gT (ℓ)};
if there are more than one such sets S, the mechanism breaks ties according to the lexicographic
order over all subsets of M. The items in M \ S are assigned to the leaves.
Now for any i ∈ M fix all bids in the input except for ri, i.e., fix the vectors r−i and ℓ. The
following function ψi[r−i, ℓ] defines the so called critical value for the bid ri. We omit the
argument r−i, ℓ whenever they are obvious from the context.
▶ Definition 22.
ψi = ψi[r−i, ℓ] = min
T :i/∈T
{r(T ) + gT (ℓ)} − min
T :i∈T
{r(T \ {i}) + gT (ℓ)}
3 For simplicity of presentation we give here all definitions and lemmata for the case of stars, and discuss
the necessary changes for hyper-stars in the full version.
4 We call a setfunction P increasing, if P (S′) ≤ P (S) whenever S′ ⊂ S; we call it strictly increasing if
the inequality is strict.
5 See also the virtual payments in [12].
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The next lemma states that ψi is nonnegative, and is, indeed, a critical value function. The
proofs are straightforward, and due to space limitations are deferred to the full version.
▶ Lemma 23. Let i ∈ M, and arbitrary nonnegative bid vectors r−i and ℓ be fixed. Then
ψi[r−i, ℓ] ≥ 0, furthermore for every ri < ψi the root player receives task i, and for every
ri > ψi the leaf player with bid ℓi receives task i.
The following lemma provides various necessary or sufficient conditions for the truthfulness
of Hybrid Mechanisms in terms of monotonicity of the critical value function ψi as a function
of ℓi. For the proof of the lemma see the full version. There we also present an example
mechanism showing that conditions (b) and (c) are both not necessary for the Hybrid
Mechanism to be truthful.
▶ Lemma 24. For the truthfulness of the Hybrid Mechanism with given {gT }T ⊆M functions
(i.e., for a truthful payment scheme to exist),
(a) it is necessary that for every i ∈ M and every fixed (r−i, ℓ−i) the function ψi(ℓi) =
ψi[r−i, ℓ−i](ℓi) is an increasing function of ℓi;
(b) it is sufficient that for every i ∈ M and every fixed (r−i, ℓ−i) the function ψi(ℓi) =
ψi[r−i, ℓ−i](ℓi) is a strictly increasing function of ℓi;
(c) it is sufficient that for every i and ℓ−i the gT (ℓi, ℓ−i) is an increasing function of ℓi
whenever i /∈ T, and decreasing function of ℓi whenever i ∈ T.
▶ Corollary 25. The Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Balancing and the Hybrid Lp Mechanism
on stars are truthful.
Proof. The first statement follows from the fact that the Hybrid Mechanism for Graph Bal-
ancing fulfils (c). Clearly, gT (ℓ) = maxi/∈T {ℓi} = maxi∈M\T {ℓi} is an increasing setfunction
of the sets M \ T, and therefore a decreasing setfunction of the sets T, for fixed ℓ. For fixed
T, maxi/∈T {ℓi} is an increasing function of ℓi for every i /∈ T, and it is independent of ℓi
(constant function) if i ∈ T. Finally, it is easy to see that the Hybrid Lp Mechanism (see
Section 5) fulfils (b) as well as (c). ◀
5 Mechanisms for Lp-norm optimization
In this section we generalize some of the results of Section 3 to the objective of minimizing





The makespan scheduling problem is the special case of p = ∞. We consider all positive
values of p, but we deal separately with the case p ≥ 1, in which Lp is a proper norm, and
the case p ∈ (0, 1), where the Lp function is not subadditive (i.e., the triangle inequality does
not hold). Due to space limitations we postpone most of the results and their proofs to the
full version of the paper. There we also consider the maximization case, which for p = 1
corresponds to auctions.
Consider an instance of the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem on a star of n nodes and
set of tasks M . Notice that for stars the objective of minimizing the Lp-norm corresponds to






p over all task sets T ⊆ M given to the r-player.
G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, and A. Kovács 56:17
▶ Definition 26 (Hybrid Lp Mechanism for stars). For a given 0 < p ≤ ∞, and an instance
of the Unrelated Graph Balancing problem on a star of n nodes and set M of tasks, let









The mechanism assigns S to the root and the remaining tasks to leaves. Ties are broken in a
deterministic way (e.g., lexicographically).
The argmin expression that defines the Hybrid Lp Mechanism coincides with the VCG
mechanism for p = 1 and with the Hybrid Mechanism of Section 3 for p → ∞. As it is shown
in Corollary 25, the Hybrid Lp mechanism is truthful.
Next we show two upper bound results for the approximation ratio (for the Lp-norm
objective) separately in case p ≥ 1, and in case 0 < p ≤ 1, respectively. We summarize here
the inequalities that we will use:




























▶ Theorem 28. For the problem of minimizing the Lp-norm, the Hybrid Lp Mechanism for
stars has approximation ratio of at most 2(p−1)/p, when p ≥ 1, and 2(1−p)/p, when 0 < p < 1.






p be the subset assigned to the root in the
optimal allocation, S be the subset assigned to the root by the Lp Mechanism, OPT be the
optimal Lp-norm, and ALG be the Lp-norm achieved by the Hybrid Lp Mechanism.


























where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, the second from the definition
of the Hybrid Lp Mechanism, while the last one from Jensen’s inequality (Lemma 27,
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the second from the definition of the Lp Mechanism, while the last one from the fact that
(α+ β)p ≤ αp + βp, when 0 < p ≤ 1. ◀
As in the case of makespan, we can use the mechanism to other domains by decomposing
them. We can apply the Star-Cover mechanism (Definition 10) to get good approximation
ratios for general domains:
▶ Theorem 29. For p ≥ 1, the Star-Cover mechanism for a given multigraph G that uses the
Hybrid Lp Mechanism on every star of a fixed star decomposition T = {T1, . . . , Tk} is truthful
and has an approximation ratio at most (2c(T ))(p−1)/p of the Lp-norm of the machines’ costs,
where c(T ) is the star contention number of the decomposition.
We also provide corresponding negative results for mechanisms. For the case, of p ≥ 1,
the next theorem shows that the Hybrid Lp Mechanism has optimal approximation ratio.
▶ Theorem 30. For any p ≥ 1, there is no deterministic mechanism for stars that can
achieve an approximation ratio better than 21−1/p for the Lp-objective.
We point out that all known (local) mechanisms perform much worse that the Hybrid
Mechanism. Observe that for p = 1, the VCG is optimal, but for large p the inefficiency of
all local mechanisms grows and tends to
√
m :
▶ Theorem 31. For minimizing the Lp-norm on stars, all local mechanisms, including
affine minimizers and task-independent mechanisms, have approximation ratio of at least
m
1
2 (1−1/p) = (n− 1) 12 (1−1/p), when p ≥ 1.
The lower bound that we give for the case of p < 1 does not match exactly the upper bound,
which leaves open the possibility that there exists a mechanism with better approximation
ratio than the Hybrid Lp Mechanism. Notice that the following approximation ratio tends
to infinity as p tends to 0.
▶ Theorem 32. For any 0 < p ≤ 1 and every a > 1, there is no deterministic mechanism








By selecting an appropriate a, this is Ω(p−1/ ln(p−1)).
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